Abstract: We examine the prices quoted by specialists (or dealers) who have monopoly power to set prices (bids and asks) for a given asset, but who face indirect competition from other specialists who trade in related assets. In the context of a simple model where investors have mean{variance preferences, we c haracterize the equilibrium bids and asks quoted by K specialists in N assets, where some specialists may control more than one asset. We compare the equilibrium spreads as the number (and factor structure) of the assets each specialist controls is varied. It is shown that for some constellations of initial portfolio holdings and asset covariance it is socially preferred to have competing specialists, while for others it is socially preferred to have their actions coordinated (or to have one specialist control several assets). In a simple factor model, we show h o w the optimal specialist control structure depends on whether the assets trade as substitutes or complements. In some situations it is benecial to have specialist power concentrated within industries, in other situations, across industries, and in yet other situations, not to be concentrated at all.
Introduction
This paper is about indirect competition between specialists. We argue, however, that it relates to nancial markets more generally, when competition between dealers or traders is imperfect. Competition between traders may be imperfect whenever entry to the trading place is limited by the number of seats or when the set of available prices is restricted. We take as given the imperfectly competitive nature of the market place 3 and in this context study the design of the specialist structure. How should the rights to make a market in dierent assets be distributed across the specialists?
At the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) bid and ask prices for individual stocks are set by specialists, who enjoy the exclusive right to determine those prices. At the opening of trading the imbalance of market orders is private information of the specialist, who determines a \fair" price to clear all market orders and can add a market order. This exclusive right to determine opening prices grants market power to the specialist. Furthermore, the specialist has full knowledge of the limit order book and gets to see incoming orders on the electronic routing system before anyone else. In turn, the specialist is committed to quote buying and selling prices and to transact standard quantities at those prices.
Despite this \monopoly" position in determining prices for a particular security, the specialist faces potential competition from trades which circumvent the specialist, 4 from trade in related securities, and from other sources. In the case of the NYSE, Demsetz (1968) argues that competitive pressure from related and rival markets will avoid excessive spreads. \Competition of several types will keep the observed spread close to cost. The main types of competition emanate from (1) rivalry for the specialist's job, (2) competing markets, (3) outsiders who submit limit orders rather than market orders, (4) oor traders who may b ypass the specialist by crossing buy and sell orders themselves, (5) and other specialists" (Demsetz, 1968, p.43) . In this paper we study indirect competition between specialists in a simple model to identify conditions under which such competition narrows bid-ask spreads and improves welfare.
Since assets are dierentiated in their risk characteristics, typically, the correlation structure of asset returns determines the assets' substitutability i n i n v estment portfolios. Positively correlated assets are substitutes, while negatively correlated assets are complements which i n v estors would like to hold in tandem. So highly positively correlated assets tend to be highly substitutable and, accordingly, specialists trading in such shares may emerge as close competitors. Consequently, and more generally, the underlying correlation structure of assets determines the specialists' market power. So, when all assets are \closely correlated" 3 See Brusco and Jackson (1996) for a discussion of why imperfect competition may be the constrained ecient trading structure in the face of costs of participating in the market across time.
(in the sense that each asset can be closely approximated by a portfolio of the remaining assets), indeed Demsetz's conjecture (5) may be right and regulators should be less concerned about the monopoly power of independent specialists. This basic analysis, however, is complicated by t w o factors. First, the substitutability or complementarity of assets depends not only on the correlation of their payos, but also on the initial distribution of asset holdings. Depending on the initial asset holdings, positively correlated assets can trade as complements. Second, each specialist unit 5 typically controls many stocks rather than just one. Thus concentrating the debate about a monopolistic dealer in isolation is misleading. The ownership structure of the specialist rights in conjunction with the correlation structure of the underlying assets and the (initial) distribution of asset holdings are crucial in determining the competitiveness of stock trading. We shall demonstrate that the initial distribution of assets and the correlation structure of the underlying assets jointly determine whether trades in given securities behave like complements or substitutes.
We nd that there are constellations in which joint o wnership of specialist rights is in the public as well as in the private interest. These contradict the simple intuition that less concentrated control will always lead to greater competition and thus higher welfare. For example, in situations where the demands for two assets are complementary, a single specialist dealing in both assets will charge lower spreads than competing specialists. The single specialist sees the benet from the fact that a lower spread for one asset stimulates demand for the other asset, while competing specialists do not internalize this externality. I n such a situation, having a single specialist control both assets oers a strict Pareto improvement compared to having competing specialists. This type of situation (complementary demands for two assets) could arise with negatively correlated assets and investors who want to increase or decrease the overall size of their portfolios. It could also arise with positively correlated assets, in situations where investors are currently holding unbalanced (i.e., other than market) portfolios. The trading environment, characterized by the correlation structure of the underlying assets and the nature of portfolio imbalances, determines, whether trades in assets are complements or substitutes. When trades behave like complements it is privately and socially desirable to have a single specialist trading in both securities. When trades behave like substitutes independent o wnership is socially preferred.
The right to become a specialist in a given stock is allocated to a member of the exchange by general consensus among the exchange's member rms 6 . Since the number of seats in a nancial market is limited, typically there are far fewer rms owning the specialists' rights than there are securities traded.
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In an 5 On the NYSE in 1990 specialists controlled on average more than 4 stocks each. In addition, specialists were clustered into groups (averaging about 10 specialists each) called specialist units.
6
For example, rule 103B (NYSE, Constitution and Rules, April 1st, 1991) reads: \Securities listing on the Exchange will be allocated to specialist units according to such policies as are established and made known to the membership from time to time".
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In December 1990 a total of 1774 companies were listed at the NYSE. Their securities were allocated to 421 individual specialists, who each belonged to one of 46 specialist units. (See 1991 NYSE factbook.) exchange in which nancial rms concentrate on industries with similar risk characteristics, one would typically expect a less competitive outcome and higher bid-ask spreads than in a market in which member rms hold diversied specialist rights. As we show, however, such a statement hinges on the initial allocation of assets.
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Our approach also suggests that competition for listings will entail important consequences for trading. The number and the type of rms listed in a given (protected) market may substantially aect its liquidity. 9 We therefore give another potential explanation for the NYSE's concern about not being able to attract NASDAQ listed rms like I n tel, Microsoft, Apple and Novell: Besides the obvious interest in direct trading revenues in those securities (and the precedence of large rms choosing not to list on the NYSE) there may be an important indirect interest in relaxing competition for other NYSE quoted computer stocks, and/or stimulating demand for complementary stocks listed on the NYSE.
The literature about the determinants of bid and ask prices in specialist markets largely concentrates on the costs of inventory holdings 10 and informational dierences between traders and specialists
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. Market structure is considered an important determinant of prices as far as direct competition between dealers in the same security is concerned 12 . The only previous study of the role of imperfect competition among specialists in determining bid-ask spreads is by Hagerty (1991) . 13 Hagerty examined monopolistic competition among specialists selling securities correlated with non-tradable endowment risks faced by i n v estors. She shows that, under certain conditions, the bid-ask spreads go to zero and that the market becomes asymptotically ecient as the number of securities becomes large. She also shows that spreads are larger for securities with lower idiosyncratic risks (better hedging characteristics), and that with a xed cost of entry there may b e too many securities oered in the market relative to the social optimum. In Hagerty's model, securities are independently distributed about the non-traded endowment, their main purpose is hedging of that risk, and they are held in zero net supply. The demand for securities in her model is driven by their correlation with the non{traded initial endowment: their ability to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk therein; hence, her securities always trade as substitutes. Our contribution is in identifying how the trading and competitive pressures on specialists depend on the correlation of asset payos, and their initial distribution among the trading population. Our model diers from Hagerty's (1991) in its basic design. In her model securities are best thought of as futures contracts. Our assets are all in non-zero net supply, are traded, and are held in initial portfolios. Thus our model is best thought o f a s a s t o c k market. This permits an analysis of trading 8 Obviously, when the initial allocation is ecient, specialists will not enjoy a n y market power under either market organization. We show that for dierent inital distributions of securities the desirability o f single ownership versus independent o wnership may be completely reversed.
9
See Gehrig, Stahl, Vives (1993) for a related point.
10
See e.g. Garman (1976) , Amihud, Mendelson, (1980) and Ho, Stoll (1981) .
11
See e.g. Stoll (1985, section VI) and Glosten, Milgrom (1985) .
12
For example, see Roell (1988) , Dennert (1993) , and Bernhardt and Hughson (1996) . 13 There has been work on the role of heterogenous information in price formation in imperfectly competitive m ulti-security markets, e.g. Admati (1985) and Caball e and Krishnan (1994). complementarities and thus introduces new facets to the competitive picture.
The analysis is performed in a highly stylized static model. Investors, characterized by mean-variance utility functions, have initial portfolio imbalances and try to trade towards their desired holdings. They cannot trade directly in a Walrasian market but need to trade through intermediaries, who are specialists in a protected market and therefore the sole supplier of the transaction services. (In section 7 we consider the eect of free entry of intermediaries for some assets.)
The assumption of a protected asset market is extreme and only serves the purpose to insulate indirect competition among specialists from sources of direct intra-asset competition. By submitting limit orders suciently patient traders can actually compete with specialists. Impatient traders, typically, prefer to submit market orders that are transacted immediately. In this vein Gehrig (1993) analyzes direct competition between a specialist and an underlying frictional market of direct exchange. He shows that the specialists' market power is aected by the strength of the trading friction and that in equilibrium traders with a high urgency of trade will trade with the specialist while traders with a low urgency of trade will enter the frictional market. Trades with the specialist are executed immediately while trades in the frictional market are delayed in some states of nature. Our approach is orthogonal to this analysis and can be understood as a situation when direct trade is frictional and traders are suciently impatient in a more general setting.
The basic liquidity model is outlined in section 2. In section 3 we c haracterize the benchmark competitive equilibrium where bid-ask spreads are set to zero and prices are chosen to clear markets. In section 4 we provide a general solution for bids and asks charged by a n y conguration of specialists controlling N assets. That is, some specialists may control several assets. In Section 5, to draw some intuition from the general solution, we specialize to the case of two assets and two alternative distributions of initial endowments. We demonstrate how these distributions and the asset covariance structure aect equilibrium bid-ask spreads of two independent, rival specialists, and how these spreads compare to the spreads charged by a single specialist controlling both assets. Another specialization is adopted in section 6 where asset returns are assumed to be characterized by a factor structure. Specically, w e compare dierent control structures when industry factors are present to understand whether it is more benecial to have specialist control coordinated within industries, or across industries.. Section 7 discusses competition between an exchange with limited entry (such as the NYSE or NASDAQ) and a competitive (free entry) market. In section 8, we allow for general risk aversion and trading on the side of the specialists, and show that the solution to the individual specialist's prot maximization problem under risk aversion can be made arbitrarily close to the solution of the match-making specialists, by increasing the number of buyers and sellers. Hence, in large markets, the analysis of sections 4{7 is a reasonable approximation for the case of risk averse specialists. All proofs appear in an appendix.
The Basic Model 5
Trading opportunities are created by the incongruence of initial and desired portfolio holdings. The divergence between initial and desired portfolios can be viewed as being caused by liquidity e v ents (see Grossman and Miller (1988) ). Trading can take place at the ocial market only.
14

Timing
There are two periods. Assets are traded in the rst period. Payos are realized in the second period and agents consume.
Assets
There is one riskless asset which serves as a numeraire and has a terminal payo normalized to 1. There are N risky assets with random terminal payosx j , j 2 f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; N g .= ( 1 ; : : : ; N ) is the vector of expected terminal payos, and is the covariance matrix, where ij is the covariance between the terminal payos of assets i and j. W e assume that is nonsingular.
Specialists
Each risky asset is traded by a specialist. There are K N specialists and we let N k f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; N g denote the set of assets controlled by specialist k. The specialist assigned to security j determines bid and ask prices (b j ; a j ).
Specialists maximize their trading revenue and must choose bids and asks to clear the market. The requirement that specialists must clear the market is made for convenience. We wish to isolate the eects of indirect competition on pricing, and do not wish to complicate the analysis with the personal inventory and investment considerations of the specialist. In section 8 we prove that the solution to this constrained problem is arbitrarily close to that of the unconstrained problem (where specialists may take positions in the assets in addition to setting bids and asks), provided that specialists have some risk aversion and there is a large enough numb e r o f i n v estors.
Investors
There are two t ypes of investors and n investors of each t ype. Except for section 8 it will not matter what n is, so until then we set n = 1 . I n v estors of type 1 are initially endowed with portfolios of the risky assets e 1 2 IR N 0 and investors of type 2 are initially endowed with e 2 2 IR N 0 . Let e be the N dimensional vector, where e j := e 1 j + e 2 j > 0 is the total stock of asset j. Dierences in the initial portfolios generate potential gains from trade. As in Grossman and Miller (1988) , the initial portfolios are allocated by some exogenous event, which m a y be viewed as a liquidity event. The demands for trade are independent of the initial holdings of the risk-free asset (given the meanvariance preferences), so without loss of generality w e set those holdings to be zero. 14 Gehrig (1993) and Yanelle (1989) provide models with concurrent direct and indirect trade.
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Given risk aversion, investors' desired asset holdings typically will dier from their endowments. Investors' have mean-variance utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion parameters r i 0, i.e. investor i 2 f 1 ; 2 g maximize expected utility o f w ealthW i :
These preferences are consistent, for instance, with negative exponential utility and normally distributed asset payos.
Let q i j denote the nal holdings of asset j by i n v estor i. A t given bid and ask prices nal wealth is determined by:
The Competitive Benchmark Case
It is useful to consider the competitive outcome as a benchmark. The standard competitive equilibrium requires single market clearing prices p j = b j = a j for each security.
In this case, maximization of expected utility yields the following demand system for assets:
In a competitive equilibrium market demand equals market supply and thus, equilibrium prices are: When specialists possess market power, they can demand premia and competitive pricing will fail to hold. This is the subject of the next section.
Strategic Specialists: A General Solution
When entry into the organized market is limited specialists enjoy market power. In principle, they can exercise it in order to maximize transaction revenues and to structure their own asset portfolio. In the next four sections we concentrate on the case in which specialists maximize revenues from trading and cannot hold net positions.
Denote trades of investor i = 1 ; 2 in asset j by i j := q i j e i j . S o i j > 0 denotes a buy and i j < 0 denotes a sell order. The direction of trade depends on the position of the desired portfolio holdings relative to the initial allocation. There is zero trade when the initial portfolios happen to be identical with the desired portfolios. To jointly solve for the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the game where specialists choose bids and asks, one has to nd the sets of bids and asks which solve the maximization problem of each specialist, taking the other prices (and their eects on demands) as given. One also has to check that the demands of investors at the quoted prices are consistent with the bids and the asks. That is, one has to verify that investors' equilibrium demands are nonnegative at the ask, if they are trading at the ask, and nonpositive at the bid, if they are trading at the bid.
The following proposition characterizes the general solution to the problem with K specialists and N assets, where K N. F or simplicity, in the sequel we shall concentrate on the case of identical investor risk aversion r 1 = r 2 = r.
Since the determination of who will sell and who will buy is dependent on the covariance matrix, the endowments, and the equilibrium prices, we cannot specify which prices will be bids and which will be asks beforehand. Thus, we specify p 1 to be the prices that investors of type 1 trade at, and p 2 to be the prices that investors of type 2 trade at. In section 5, when we examine particular endowments, specialist structures, and asset structures, we can identify which prices are bids and which are asks. As is clear in the proof, this solution is unique if demands are non-zero. If at the solution demands turn out to be zero for some assets, then equilibrium is still almost unique: there may be a continuum of prices in those assets (any l o w er bids and higher ask spreads) which result in the same demands. 
Proof: See the appendix.
There are several things to notice about the general solution. First, bid and ask prices are symmetric around the competitive price. This is a result of the market clearing restriction and the simple linear demand structure. As one might expect, the ask is always higher than the competitive price, while the bid is always lower. Second, the price spread is increasing in risk aversion. This reects the specialists' response to the investors' more inelastic demands which result from larger potential gains from trade. Third, the spread is \roughly" increasing in the initial dierence in endowments, but the exact eect depends on the structure of A and thus on the covariance structure of the assets' payos. Fourth, we can interpret the structure of A as reecting the importance of cross price elasticities. The basic entries of A reect the general interplay of cross price elasticities in the pricing solution of an imperfectly competitive market. The fact that some entries are doubled, reects the fact that a specialist who controls more than one asset cares about the eect of each price on each of the assets that he or she controls.
Further direct interpretation of the above solutions is dicult in this abstract form, so in order to obtain additional intuition and make comparisons across correlation structures and endowments, we specialize to the case of two assets in the next section, and then analyze a four asset example with an underlying factor structure in Section 6. In initial portfolio holding (A), investors dier in the level of their holdings only, and in equilibrium investor 1 will sell both assets while investor 2 will buy both assets. (A) represents a situation in which investors need to change the sizes of their portfolios, but do not need to rebalance them. In initial portfolio holding (B), investors have exactly one of the two assets, and in equilibrium each i n v estors will wish to buy one asset and sell the other. Thus (B) represents a situation in which i n v estors are primarily rebalancing their portfolios.
These dierent portfolio holdings will aect the strategic properties of trades in the two risky assets. For example, consider the case of almost perfectly correlated assets. Under initial portfolio holding (A) investor 1 desires to trade his risky position with investor 2 whose risk bearing capacity is underutilized. Under initial portfolio holding (B) the desire to trade is fairly small since both investors basically hold identical portfolios and there are little gains from diversication. In this case, it appears that specialist market power should be larger in (A) than in (B). As the correlation coecient b e t w een the assets decreases, the diversication incentive becomes stronger and eventually investors are more eager to trade in initial portfolio holding (B) than (A), since both can reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. In such cases the specialist market power is larger in (B) than in (A).
Denote the spread in prices for asset j, a j b j , b y s j .
Independent Specialists
First we consider the case of two independent specialists in the two risky assets. Specialist 1 controls asset 1 and specialist 2 controls asset 2.
Corollary 5.1
In a (non-cooperative) price setting game between two specialists, the Nash equilibrium prices and spreads are, provided min ensures that the stated prices reect the bids and asks. This condition is not very restrictive and is always satised if, for instance, e 1 = e 2 and 1 = 2 . If this condition is violated, the only change in the Corollary will be a relabelling of which expressions correspond to bids and which ones correspond to asks.
Corollary 5.1 provides additional intuitive aspects of the equilibrium bids and asks. First, note that as ! 1 competition intensies and bid-ask spreads decline, as assets become more substitutable. 16 Second, spreads are larger for < 0 than for > 0 of the same magnitude, reecting the complementary nature of negatively correlated assets and the substitutable nature of positively correlated assets. Third, we n o w get a clearer look at the entries of A from Proposition 4.1. Notice that the diagonal terms involve expressions of i j . These terms are thus based on the regression coecients of one asset on the other. These expressions are essential in determining the demands for the assets, and thus enter into cross price elasticity calculations and the equilibrium solution. From these we can see, in addition to the above remarked comparative statics in , that the spread for an asset is declining in the ratio of its variance relative to the variance of the other asset (assuming a positive correlation, with just the reverse for a negative correlation). The higher its relative v ariance, the less attractive the asset is in the portfolio.
Interestingly, for correlated assets ( 6 = 0) specialists' price quotes dier in the two trading environments.
Substituting from (4) To understand this result, we need to look at how the initial asset holdings aect the demands of the investors. It is those demands to which the specialists ultimately respond. When assets are positively correlated, the initial endowment o f t ype 1 investors in case (A) is riskier than the initial endowment o f t y p e 1 i n v estors in case (B). This can be seen since = 2 (where these are the variances in resulting wealth if no trading occurs, given the endowments). Accordingly, when the initial endowment position is riskier, investor 1 has a larger need to sell asset 1. Hence, the supply of asset 1 is less elastic. By an analogous argument i n v estor 2's demand for asset 1 is less elastic when his or her initial position is less risky. T h us, when assets are positively correlated the specialist in security 1 enjoys more market power in case (A) and when assets are negatively correlated market power is larger in case (B).
Joint Prot Maximization: A Monopolistic Specialist 16
This can be seen by substituting from (4) for p c , and then factoring out a 1 2 .
It would seem that competition between specialists would be impaired by the fact that the specialist seats are owned by a few specialist units. In 1990, for example, at the NYSE 1741 dierent common stocks were traded by 421 specialists, who again belonged to 46 specialist units.
17
So at the NYSE, on average, a specialist exercised rights in just over 4 stocks and a specialist unit exercised specialist rights in about 38 stocks in 1990. Let us examine how the competitiveness of an exchange depends on the distribution of stocks across specialists and specialist units.
A rm owning specialist rights in two stocks may prevent them from competing intensely, particularly for highly substitutable stocks. In this sense, joint o wnership may destroy the benets of competition. However, in the case of complementary securities, the monopolist may actually also charge lower prices and enhance welfare. By pricing assets, which behave like complements appropriately, aggregate trading volume can be increased. The monopolist specialist unit can take advantage of the aggregate trading volume by c harging lower spreads than independent units. In this way joint o wnership may reduce trading costs, enhance trading revenues and overall welfare accordingly.
We can examine the predictions of Proposition 4.1 in the case of a single specialist who jointly controls the prices of two assets or two specialists who choose prices to maximize the sum of their revenues: In initial portfolio holding (A), when > 0 e quilibrium spreads in the case of independent specialist units are smaller than in the case of a single specialist, i.e. s I;A z < s M;A z for z = 1 ; 2 . When < 0 , e quilibrium spreads in the case of independent specialist units are larger than in the case of a single specialist, i.e. s I;A z > s M;A z for z = 1 ; 2 .
In initial portfolio holding (B), when > 0 e quilibrium spreads in the case of independent specialist units are larger than in the case of a single specialist unit, i.e. s I;B z > s M;B z for z = 1 ; 2 . When < 0 , e quilibrium spreads in the case of independent specialist units are smaller than in the case of a single specialist unit, i.e. Corollary 5.4 identies situations where a single specialist unit trading in both stocks, will yield lower bid-ask spreads in both markets than would be chosen by t w o independent specialists. In fact, when social welfare is measured as the sum of specialists' trading prots and investors' expected utility, social welfare may be higher, when the pricing of the two securities is coordinated (controlled by the same specialist unit). The specialists' prots are simply transfers of the risk free asset from investors, and so total societal welfare is decreasing in the bid-ask spread, since investor welfare is decreasing in the bid-ask spread. The socially preferable ownership structures are summarized as follows:
Corollary 5.5
Let 1 = 2 and e 1 = e 2 .
Under initial portfolio holding (A): for > 0 independent ownership of the two specialists is socially preferable, while for < 0 single ownership is socially preferable, and Under initial portfolio holding (B): for > 0 single ownership of the two specialists is socially preferable, while for < 0 independent ownership is socially preferable.
14 In some of the above cases we can make stronger statements about the socially preferred structure: we can strictly Pareto rank them. When specialists choose their bid ask spreads to jointly maximize their prots, they prot more than they would acting independently (provided 6 = 0). In some such cases, the joint maximization solution also results in lower spreads which are better for the investors as well. Concentration of ownership in one specialist unit strictly Pareto dominates independent o wnership either under initial portfolio holding (A) and negative correlation, or under initial portfolio holding (B) under positive correlation. Hence, both the correlation of the underlying assets, as well as the distribution of assets across investors will determine the social desirability of a monopolistic (or cartellized) market organization relative to a more competitive organization with independent specialists.
What really matters for the social desirability of monopoly are the properties of the demand functions for transactions. These depend both on the initial portfolio holdings and the correlation structure of the assets. Trades in assets 1 and 2 behave like substitutes in initial portfolio holding (A) when > 0 and in initial portfolio holding (B) when < 0, and then it is socially preferable to have independently acting specialists. To see this we examine the desired trades. The proof of Proposition 4.1 reveals that in the case of initial portfolio holding (A) transactions demand can be written as: These formulations demonstrate that in case (A) trades in assets 1 and 2 behave like complements when < 0 and like substitutes when > 0. Just the reverse is true in case (B). Thus, under initial portfolio holding (A) when < 0 (and under initial portfolio holding (B) when > 0) it is better to have joint maximization by the specialists.
Empirically negative correlation among assets may seem uncommon. In the case of positive correlation, the substitutable or complementary nature of the demand for the assets then depends on the portfolio imbalances. In this case, the model predicts that the endowment structure still decisively aects equilibrium spreads. When trading is dominated by trading assets in tandem, (as in an index { case (A)) independent 18 These formulations stipulate bid prices consistent with equilibrium. ownership is socially preferred, while single ownership yields lower spreads when stocks are predominantly traded on the basis of individual assets (case (B) ). An exception is the case where one asset is a derivative security on another. For instance, the demands for a security and an option on that security are often complementary. In such cases, our results would suggest that, in the presence of imperfect competition, it would be benecial to have the same specialists control both markets.
We should mention that the analysis we h a v e provided is an interim one, where the covariance structure and and initial portfolio imbalances are known. Ideally, as these may c hange over time (and one may not wish to continuously reallocate specialist rights) one would want to perform an ex ante analysis which incorporates the likelihood of various trading complementarities.
The result of Corollary 5.5 parallels the nding of Spence (1976) that monopoly may be socially desirable in the case of complementary products. In a trading framework the complementarity of trades matters, not necessarily the complementarity in payos of the underlying assets. Still, the correlation structure of the underlying assets is an important factor in determining the degree of market power an inividual specialist can exert; it is just not the only factor.
Similar results about the social desirability of monopoly in situations of imperfect competition are obtained by Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) in settings with consumer search costs. These authors nd that a monopolist might c harge lower prices because of the benets from the associated increase in local demand (market expansion eect). Our results are driven by a dierent externality, but come to similar conclusions concerning the desirability of monopoly. In some of the situations described in corollary 5.5, lower spreads increase aggregate trading volume and the monopolist benets most. In these situations joint ownership is socially optimal.
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Factor Structures and Optimal Specialist Structures
In this section we further explore the dependence of the optimal specialist control structure on the underlying covariance of asset payos and the initial portfolio holdings. Here, we expand the analysis of the previous section to allow for four assets whose covariance structure is derived from a simple factor structure.
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The factor structure of asset payos represents two industries, with two assets (or rms) in each industry. There is a factor common to all four assets, and a separate factor common to each of the two dierent industries. Each asset also has an idiosyncratic component. One can consider specialist control structures, ranging from independent specialists to a single specialist. In particular, in the case of some joint control, one can examine whether it is better to have specialists coordinated within industries or across industries.
Industry Factors
Consider the factor structurex According to the arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976) only the systematic risk of assets is priced. This builds on the implicit assumption that idiosyncratic risk is eliminated when the number of available assets is large. In competitive markets arbitrage ensures that asset prices are determined as weighted averages of the prices for factor risk. In imperfectly competitive markets, however, the ability to arbitrage can be severely impeded. In this section, we illustrate the determination of the bid-ask spread in imperfectly competitive markets (proposition 4.1), when the payos of the underlying assets are characterized by a simple factor structure.
can take t w o dierent forms: When each specialist controls both assets of an industry the control structure which w e call factor ownership (F), and when each specialist controls one asset in each industry we call the structure cross-industry ownership (X). In the cross-industry ownership case, we assign one specialist to assets 1 and 3, and the other specialist to assets 2 and 4.
We determine the equilibrium spreads s I , s M , s F , and s X for each specialist ownership structure, under four alternative initial endowment v ectors which are characterized by e = e 1 e 2 . The spreads in each asset are identical given the symmetry of demands for each asset. The statement that societal welfare is monotonic in size of the spreads again applies (as do the implications for Pareto ranking noted following Corollary 5.5). Proof: See the appendix.
Corollary 6.1 shows us that various control structures may turn out to be optimal, depending on the initial asset holdings.
Again, we can interpret the above results in terms of the complementarity of the associated demands for each asset. In case a), all of the assets trade as substitutes. In this case it is best to have independent specialists. Furthermore, conditional on having only two specialists, it is preferable to have them set across industries as these are weaker substitutes. In case b), assets within an industry trade as substitutes and across industries they trade as complements. In this case it is best to have t w o specialists set up across industries. The specialists will compete inside each industry, but will adjust spreads downward for some of the complementarities which exist across industries. Here, having independent specialists is better than having factor (industry) ownership, as assets are substitutes within an industry. The spreads are largest for factor (industry) ownership since the competitive pressure is lower and complementarities in trades are not accounted for. Hence, both joint o wnership and independent o wnership outperform factor (industry) ownership. Joint o wnership partially internalizes the complementarities and independent o wnership increases competition. It turns out that the relative advantage of joint o wnership relative to independent o wnership depends on the relative strength of the force of competition relative to the importance of the complementarity in trade.
20
In case c), assets within an industry trade as complements and across industries some of them trade as substitutes and others as complements. In this case it is best to have factor (industry) ownership as the specialists will compete across industries, but adjust spreads downwards for some of the complementarities which exist within the industries. For the given endowment structure competition between the two industry specialists is just the same as the additional complementarity consideration which a a monopolist accounts for across industries (for example between assets 1 and 4), and so the spreads for factor (industry) ownership are the same as under joint o wnership. Competition reduces equilibrium spreads in the case of independent ownership relative to cross-industry ownership. Finally, case d) is similar to case c), except for the assignment of which assets the cross industry specialists control. Here, they control the complements and thus do better than the independent specialists. In case d) assets are stronger complements (due to their higher correlation) within an industry than across industries, which explains why factor (industry) ownership dominates cross{ industry ownership.
Note that the monopolist structure is never optimal in a strict sense in Corollary 6.1. Although a monopolist internalizes some of the complementarities, the monopolists also controls substitutes. Given the covariance structure associated with the factor structure in this section, it is impossible for all assets to trade as complements. Thus, we always nd another ownership structure, in particular one which concentrates only complements in the hands of the same specialist, (weakly) dominating a monopolist.
Corollary 6.1 reiterates the fact that the direction of trades crucially aects specialists' market power and, hence, ultimately the costs of trading. In other words, the desirability of one control structure over another depends very much on the nature of the trading activities and the interrelationships of the demands. The determination of an optimal ownership structure for a specialist market will have to take i n to account empirical complementarities between trades in dierent assets.
The complementarity in trade is particularly important when 
Ownership Structure in Competing Exchanges
Our previous analysis relies on barriers to entry. There may be reasons to restrict entry into securities trading on organized markets. Dennert (1993) , for example, shows that in an asymmetric information framework, insiders' opportunities to hide information increases in the number of market makers, which causes bid-ask spreads to widen, as the number of market makers increases. The introduction of the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) did not cause an erosion of NYSE trading volumes or revenues, despite the fact that NYSE-quoted stocks could be traded elsewhere. This suggests that there are segments in securities markets, which are eectively protected from direct competition. On the other hand, entry seems rather easy in other segments of securities markets. In this section we analyze situations under symmetric information, where an open market with unrestricted entry and a protected market with limited entry co-exist. In particular, we are interested in the consequences of the indirect competition induced by the correlation of assets. If one asset is traded in a protected market and the other asset is traded in a competitive market, how d o t h e resulting prices compare to the situation we h a v e analyzed so far? Security 1 is traded by a specialist and security 2 is traded on a competitive dealership market with free (and costless) entry. Price competition 21 for trades ensures that a 2 = b 2 = p. Notice, however, that the price p typically depends on the monopolist's price choices (a 1 ; b 1 ) and therefore may dier from the competitive price p c 2 . Competition in the competitive segment does not necessarily yield the Walrasian outcome in that market segment. As the following Proposition shows, however, it does in equilibrium. Strictly speaking, intermediaries can sell any u n w anted inventory of stocks in further rounds of trading. This assumption rules out non-Walrasian equilibria in the case of inelastic demand as discussed by Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1989 The above analysis is only suggestive, since the nature of competition in the protected market will depend on correlations among numerous assets traded in the protected market and competitive markets. Thus, in a multi-market context the question about the desirability of dierent o wnership structures is likely to be a dicult one. While the correlation of the underlying assets traded in a given exchange is an important piece of information, additionally information about the cross correlations with assets traded elsewhere may be important, as well as information about initial portfolio holdings. All these variables jointly determine, whether trades in a given set of assets are substitutes or complements. When these trades behave like complements, i.e. an increase in the spread of one asset reduces demand for the other asset(s), joint control of the specialist rights may be benecial.
Risk Averse Specialists in Large Markets
Throughout this paper we h a v e assumed that specialists were constrained to clear their markets. In this section, we briey discuss the specialists' behavior in situations where they may hold their own portfolios of the assets, may short sell the asset, and maximize their expected utility of the trading revenue plus the value of their own holdings. We argue that with large numbers of traders, the specialists' behavior will be as we assumed in the previous sections. That is, given any level of risk aversion, the dierence between supply and demand (which is the change in the specialist's portfolio) goes to zero as a percentage of the overall supply (or demand) as the number of investors they face becomes large. Trading revenue becomes the dominant factor in the specialist's calculation, and thus their maximization problem is as if they maximized trading revenue subject to balancing supply and demand.
Starting with a given economy, replicate it n times and consider a specialist setting prices for a given asset in that replicated economy. Assume that investors of the same type are acting identically, and let q b be the amount bought b y the specialist at the bid and q a be the amount sold by the specialist at the ask, for each replication. We can write the specialist's expected utility a s 
Notice that q a a q b b + ( e s n + q b q a ) is bounded when varying a and b (individual investors are risk averse and so q a and q b are bounded). Thus, when solving (19) as n becomes large, the solution necessarily involves setting q b q a close to 0, as this enters the second term proportionally to n. The problem thus approaches maximizing q a a q b b subject to q a = q b .
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In the above argument, the specialist only holds asset 1. Provided that the assets are not perfectly correlated, allowing the specialist to hold other assets will not aect the reasoning. What is critical to the argument is that the market be large in a sense determined by the level of risk aversion of the specialist. In thinner markets, or if the specialist is not very risk averse, the specialist's own portfolio becomes an important part of the bid-ask spread determination.
Of course, our model is static and does not capture the dynamic optimization problem which a specialist faces. If trades are spread out over time, then the inventory control problem becomes a non-trivial part of the bid-ask selection. Our focus on trading prots is meant to complement existing research on the role of inventory control (and that on the role of adverse selection) in the determination of bid-ask spreads.
Concluding Comments
In this paper we argue that the ownership structure of intermediaries decisively aects the competitiveness of markets whenever intermediaries exercise some degree of market power. We argue that the complementarity of trades may be an important criterion in allocating ownership rights to intermediaries. Securities that trade as complements should be traded by the same intermediary and securities that trade as substitutes should be traded by independent i n termediaries. Whether securities trade as substitutes or complements cannot be determined on the basis of empirical correlations of asset returns alone. Rather, the empirical cross{price reactions of trades (for example, equations 11 and 12) are the relevant criterion. Hence, also the empirical nature of trades should determine, whether stocks and options should be traded on the same exchange (by the same intermediaries) or in independent markets (by independent i n termediaries).
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that stocks with similar risk return characteristics (and widely dispersed share ownership) may exhibit quite dierent patterns of trade complementarity depending on whether they are included in an actively traded index or not.
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To be careful: for any > 0 there exists n such that any solution to maximizing EU s for n n involves j q b q a j< . The theorem of the maximum ensures that the solution to maximizing EU s subject to j q b q a j= 0 is continuous as we free up the constraint.
Proof of Corollary 6.1
The proof is by application of Proposition 4.1 and involves straightforward algebra. We provide only the essential steps. Finally, w e need a condition that guarantees that all bids are positive and no ask exceeds . Given the symmetry of bids and asks about the competitive price, it follows that bids are positive and asks do not exceed if p c 1
